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Frontier Capitalism and Politics of Dispossession in Myanmar: 
The Case of the Mwetaung (Gullu Mual) Nickel Mine in Chin 
State
Rainer Einzenberger
► Einzenberger, R. (2018). Frontier capitalism and politics of dispossession in Myanmar: The case of the 
Mwetaung (Gullu Mual) nickel mine in Chin State. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 11(1), 13-34.
Since 2010, Myanmar has experienced unprecedented political and economic changes 
described in the literature as democratic transition or metamorphosis. The aim of this 
paper is to analyze the strategy of accumulation by dispossession in the frontier areas as 
a precondition and persistent element of Myanmar’s transition. Through this particular 
regime of dispossession – described as frontier capitalism – the periphery is turned into 
a supplier of resource revenues to fuel economic growth at the center. The paper takes 
up the case study of the Mwetaung (Gullu Mual) nickel mine on the border to Chin State 
and the “politics of dispossession” around this project. It analyzes the strategies, motives, 
and objectives of a broad ad-hoc coalition that emerged in 2013 to defend their access to 
land against forms of legal dispossession by the state. In this case, the attempted dispos-
session has been successfully challenged, by making use of new opportunities for political 
participation.
Keywords: Chin State; Frontier; Mining; Myanmar; Politics of Dispossession

INTRODUCTION
Following the 2010 elections, Myanmar seemed to go against the general trend in 
Southeast Asia towards increasing authoritarianism. While other countries in 
the region were returning to authoritarian rule (Thailand, for instance, entering 
its fifth year of military dictatorship in May 2018), Myanmar’s elected semi-civilian 
government seemed to push towards political liberalization. Especially after the 
electoral victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in December 
2015, hopes were high for a ‘speeding-up’ of a democratization process under 
the leadership of Nobel Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi whose stated aim is the 
“emergence of a democratic federal union” (“State Counsellor Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi’s”, 2017).1 Indeed, the majority of observers and academics understood 
1 Even though Aung San Suu Kyi was barred from officially becoming president for constitutional rea-
sons, she assumed the newly established position of State Counsellor and ministerial posts. She became 
the de facto leader of the semi-civilian government. President Htin Kyaw, installed by Aung San Suu Kyi, 
remained largely in her shadow, getting little attention and media coverage. However, he resigned recently 
and was replaced by Win Myint who is said to be as loyal to Aung San Suu Kyi (“Myanmar Parliament Elects 
Suu Kyi”, 2018).
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the recent developments as an ongoing transition from authoritarian rule under 
a former military junta towards a more liberal electoral democracy. They point to 
a number of major political achievements, such as the release of political prisoners, 
easing of media censorship, growing freedom of expressions, new ceasefire agree-
ments and more (Egreteau & Robinne, 2015, p. ix). Others are taking a more cautious 
approach and characterize the process as a “‘protracted transition’ in which oppo-
sitional forces, ethnic groups, and the military have started to renegotiate political 
power” (Bünte, 2016, p. 370); or as a “caretaking democratization” highlighting the 
continuing influence of the military and the top down nature of the political reform 
(Egreteau, 2016). Thus, a core question concerns the structural changes and continu-
ities which influence the country’s political trajectories. Egreteau and Robinne (2015) 
consequently opted for the notion of a “metamorphosis” rather than a “transition” to 
describes the “deep-seated, incremental and observable transformations but with ele-
ments of resilience if not (frustrating) persistence, such as the political salience of the 
armed forces” (p. 4). At least since the renewed outbreak of violence in Rakhine State 
in 2012 and military confrontation in the north of the country, this became painfully 
clear (Burma News International, 2017; Doyle & Rigby, 2016). The “unprecedented 
violence” against self-identifying Rohingya involving security forces, civilians, as well 
as militant armed groups, attracted massive international attention and was qualified 
by the UN as an act of “ethnic cleansing” (International Crisis Group, 2017; United 
Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2017). 
Analyzing Myanmar’s transition from a political economic perspective, Jones 
(2014a) suggested that the “military has been left ‘holding the ring’ placing broad con-
straints on the reform process” (p. 156). Rather than Myanmar becoming the next 
democratic poster child he sees the country transforming into a more “normal” 
Southeast Asian state, with state power serving only a “narrow social constituency” 
(pp. 167-168). Pointing towards a scenario potentially similar to the Cambodian expe-
rience, he describes Myanmar’s recent capitalist development as “highly rapacious and 
coercive” in an early phase of primitive accumulation (p. 167). A precondition for the 
recent transition (contrary to earlier attempts) was the incorporation of the periphery 
through an emerging “ceasefire-capitalism” (Woods, 2011). The co-optation of ethnic 
armed groups in the border areas through business concessions and transnational 
capital allowed the regime to re-focus on its roadmap to ‘disciplined democracy’ and 
ensure its own economic survival (Jones, 2014b). The specific accumulation regime, 
mainly based on the extraction and dispossession of land and natural resources in 
the frontier areas through authoritarian means (including but going beyond cease-
fire agreements) is termed here as frontier capitalism. It builds on the concept of 
the frontier which traces the particular process of accumulation, enclosures, and 
contested property regimes in areas of fragmented authority as a result of coercive 
incorporation into the national state and global circuits of capitalism (Geiger, 2009; 
Kelly & Peluso, 2015; Peluso & Lund, 2011).
The aim of this paper is to analyze frontier capitalism and the related politics 
of dispossession as a persistent element of Myanmar’s transition. While it does not 
intend to further theorize Myanmar’s political transition on a macro level (see Jones, 
2014a, 2014b), it offers empirical evidence and insights into the dynamics of the transi-
tion at the sub-national and local level. It looks at the particular case of the Mwetaung 
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(Gullu Mual) nickel mine project in northern Chin State, a politically relatively ‘stable’ 
area under ceasefire since 2012. While in other frontier areas local resistance to dis-
possession led to the breakdown of ceasefires and renewed armed conflict (Brenner, 
2015; Burma News International, 2017), civil society in Chin State is making use of 
increasing political spaces to voice their resistance. By focusing on grassroots mobili-
zation during the period from 2013 to 2014, the article aims to contribute to a growing 
body of critically engaged literature on the “politics of dispossession” (Levien, 2013a) 
in contemporary Myanmar (Prasse-Freeman, 2015; Zaw Aung & Middleton, 2016). It 
documents a notable ‘success story’ of an anti-dispossession movement which has 
received little attention in media and academic literature so far (for an exception, see 
Mark, 2016). The research presented in this paper is part of an ongoing research project 
on “Contested Frontiers” in Myanmar (Einzenberger, 2016a). It is based on literature 
review and multi-sited field research conducted between 2015 and 2017 over several 
months in Yangon, Kalay, Hakha and other locations, particularly in Chin State. Semi-
structured interviews and open interviews were conducted with civil society activists, 
representatives of communities, investors, political parties, local government, and 
others.2 In addition to interviews (conducted partly in English and in local languages 
with the support of local interpreters), the information gathered was cross-checked 
with documentation provided by the Chinland Natural Resources Watch Group 
(CNRWG, 2013) as well as (local) English online media sources (Ei Ei Toe Lwin, 2013; 
Khaipi, 2013; Kyemon & Ju Nine, 2013; Mirante, 2017; Thawng Zel Thang, 2013).3 
The article proceeds as follows: The first part introduces the theoretical core con-
cepts followed by a summary of the historical background of Myanmar’s economic 
transition from a ‘pseudo-socialist’ isolated economy to a more liberalized market 
economy. The second part of the article discusses the empirical findings of the case 
study with a special focus on the role of local civil society, political parties, and the 
local government. Furthermore, it explores the importance of land rights and indig-
enous rights issues for the anti-dispossession movement.
FRONTIER CAPITALISM AND POLITICS OF DISPOSSESSION
From a theoretical perspective, the specific process of (re-emerging) capitalist devel-
opment in the periphery areas of Myanmar can be framed as “frontier capitalism” 
(Laungaramsri, 2012).4 Here, frontier capitalism means the specific “regime of dispos-
session” (Levien, 2013b) 5, in particular the dispossession of land and natural resources 
2 The names of the local communities as well as the names of the persons interviewed remain anony-
mous in order to protect their identity.
3 I would like to thank the CNRWG for their permission to translate the Burmese language report into 
English. 
4 While Laungaramsri (2012) does not clearly define “frontier capitalism”, she argues that “provincial 
authorities have engaged in widespread transboundary and joint economic enterprises, particularly in the 
peripheries. Such collaboration, which often bypasses central governance, with chaotic boundaries be-
tween what is recognized as ‘used (or productive)’ and ‘unused (underproductive)’ resources, along with 
unclear regulatory control, allow the growth of what I call ‘frontier capitalism’” (p. 466).
5 Levien (2013b) defines “regimes of dispossession” as “socially and historically specific constellations of 
state structures, economic logics tied to particular class interests, and ideological justifications that gener-
ate a consistent pattern of dispossession” (p. 383).
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in border or frontier areas through authoritarian or outright violent means facilitated 
by the state for the benefit of a narrow elite. The concept of the frontier is a helpful 
analytical tool to explain processes of incorporation and transition of ‘unproductive 
land’ in the periphery into the national economy and ultimately the capitalist world 
system (Geiger, 2009; Hall, 2012, 2013). Frontiers are defined as sparsely populated 
areas, close to borders and rich in natural resources, where land and territory is con-
tested. Often the state claims sovereignty over those areas, but in practice falls short 
of exercising full administrative control (Geiger, 2009; Hall, 2013). Apart from being a 
zone of transition, the frontier can also be understood as a process “where authorities, 
sovereignties, rights, and hegemonies of the recent past have been challenged by new 
enclosures, property regimes, and territorializations” (Peluso & Lund, 2011, p. 667). 
The corresponding representation of the ‘imaginary frontier’ as ‘wild’, ‘unused’, 
or ‘virgin’ serves as a legitimating ideology for its exploitation. Local claims, usage 
rights, and customary practices are thus ignored or disregarded by the state, to be sac-
rificed for national development (Barney, 2009; Geiger, 2009; Kelly & Peluso, 2015). 
Processes of enclosures and primitive accumulation (or accumulation by disposses-
sion) are a defining feature of incorporation and transition in the frontier (Foweraker, 
1981; Geiger, 2009; Hall, 2013; Harvey, 2003). To this end, the state (and non-state 
actors) employ a variety of strategies and mechanisms, including both “the rifle and 
the title” (Grajales, 2011). This means, capitalist relations are not only achieved by 
outright violent dispossession but also by other more subtle means such as “legal dis-
possession” involving the state (Pichler, 2015). Thereby, state legislations (for instance 
land laws) can play a crucial role in establishing the legal basis for a new land mar-
ket through commodification of land and codification of ownership. Unsurprisingly, 
processes of coercive incorporation and dispossession in the frontier are often met 
with resistance by the local population (Hall, 2012, 2013). They challenge the forced 
imposition of capitalist relations based on state legislation, which mostly disregard 
customary practices and local modes of production. According to Levien (2013a), the 
“dispossession of land creates a specific kind of politics” which he calls “politics of 
dispossession” (pp. 355-356). This involves forms of resistance mainly targeting the 
state and applying “physical, political, and legal means to maintain possession against 
the dissipating force of brokers, and the coercive force of the state” (p. 366). Before 
discussing the “politics of dispossession” around the particular case of the Mwetaung 
project in more detail, the next section provides an overview of Myanmar’s broader 
economic transition since the beginning of the 1990s, and its impact on the frontier 
areas.
FROM BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM TO CEASEFIRE CAPITALISM
Since Myanmar abandoned its Burmese Way to Socialism and opened up its econo-
my to international investors in the beginning of the 1990s, the country’s economic 
development was essentially based on processes of primitive accumulation and 
resource extraction (Bissinger, 2012; Jones, 2014a; Lambrecht, 2004; MacLean, 
2008; Schaffar, 2008). The main motive for its ‘open-door policy’ was the desperate 
economic situation, after decades of self-imposed isolation and economic misman-
agement under military rule, which also triggered the mass uprisings of 1988. After 
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staging a coup and crushing the uprisings, the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC) took an “entrepreneurial turn” (MacLean, 2008), offering “the right 
to exploit the rich untapped natural resources of Burma to foreign investors in joint 
venture with state enterprises” (Mya Maung, 1995, p. 679). A series of laws, such as 
the wasteland instructions (1991) and mining laws (1994), were introduced to facil-
itate a market-based economy and private investment (Franco, 2016; Moody, 1999). 
The much-needed foreign exchange allowed the military junta to purchase new arms 
from China, expand its army, and tighten its grip to power against the will of the 
majority population (Mya Maung, 1995). In particular, Myanmar’s neighboring coun-
tries Thailand and China were more than willing to exploit the natural resources 
across their border and establish friendly relations with the military junta. Already 
a few months after the SLORC takeover, the Thai military and associated compa-
nies negotiated concessions for teak extraction in Myanmar, since Thailand’s own 
forests had already been depleted (Bryant, 1997). In the early 1990s, the Yadana and 
Yetagun pipelines were built by a consortium of international companies to import 
natural gas from the Andaman Sea to Thailand to secure energy for its fast-growing 
economy. This caused widespread human rights abuses and environmental degra-
dation (Earthrights International, 2000). A few years later, China started to invest in 
Myanmar following its ‘going out’ policy, overtaking Thailand as its biggest investor in 
2010 (Inclusive Development International, 2016). China mainly invested in (hydro)
power (63%), oil and gas (25%), as well as in mining (11%) (Dunn, Ji, & Peng, 2016; 
Earthrights International, 2008).
Following the 1990 elections, the military also changed its tactics towards its bor-
der areas from military interventions to ‘business solutions’. In a process described 
as “ceasefire capitalism” (Woods, 2011), members of the military regime brokered 
business deals with ethnic armed groups. Legal concessions for the extraction of 
natural resources in the border areas and other lucrative business were offered to 
ethnic elites in return for ceasefire agreements (Jones, 2014b; Schaffar, 2008; Woods, 
2011). According to Woods (2011), the Burmese army used “land concessions in cease-
fire zones as an explicit postwar military strategy to govern land and populations to 
produce regulated, legible, militarized territory” (p. 747). The ceasefires “weakened 
and co-opted much of the opposition” (Jones, 2014b, p. 780) and allowed the military 
regime to refocus on its roadmap to a ‘disciplined democracy’ in order to safeguard 
its long-term political interests. Continuing this approach, in 2011, President Thein 
Sein initiated a new round of ceasefires, which led to the signature of the National 
Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015. Yet, some ethnic armed groups who had already 
existing ceasefires (such as the Kachin Independence Army) were not included in 
the latest round. This was partly related to competing claims over access to natural 
resources in the region (Burma News International, 2017).6
As a result of the expansion of ceasefires and increasing exploitation of land and 
resources, “politics of dispossession” have clearly been on the rise since 2011 (Buchanan, 
Kramer, & Woods, 2013). Local media has documented land conflicts virtually on a daily 
basis (for some recent cases, see Htike Nanda Win, 2017; Myint Moe, 2017). Until 2015, 
6 The 1994 ceasefire “broke down after the military took control of a KIA outpost near a Chinese-run 
dam in 2011” (Burma News International, 2017, p. 7).
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the Farmland Investigation Commission (installed by the USDP – Union Solidarity 
and Development Party – government following public pressure) recorded more than 
11,000 official complaints related to conflicts over land (Htoo Thant, 2015). Prior to 
2012 communities rarely dared to speak out in public, due to heavy restrictions on 
the freedom of expression and media censorship. Since 2012 people have begun to 
exercise their ‘new freedoms’ offered by gradual political liberalization (Bünte, 2016).7 
In particular, several large-scale Chinese investment projects attracted widespread 
attention in relation to land confiscation and were targeted by public protests. The 
best-known cases were the Letpadaung/Monywa copper mine near Mandalay and 
the Myitsone hydropower dam in Kachin State with an investment volume of about 
USD 3.6 billion (Simpson, 2013). The Letpadaung/Monywa mining case became 
internationally known due to the violent crackdown of Myanmar security forces on 
peaceful protestors (including Buddhist monks) (Zerrouk & Neef, 2014). For many it 
symbolized the continuation of authoritarian means employed by the government to 
ensure an extractivist accumulation regime even after an apparent political liberali-
zation. Even the former opposition leader and current state counsellor Aung San Suu 
Kyi publicly defended the continuation of the mining project despite heavy criticism 
(“Aung San Suu Kyi Support”, 2013). The Myitsone dam on the other hand has been 
considered a success story for the anti-dispossession movement. In a nationwide 
“Save the Irrawaddy” campaign framed in ethno-political opposition to ‘Chinese 
exploitation’, a broad coalition could be formed between local ethnic activists from 
northern Myanmar (in particular Kachin State) and urban based environmental and 
pro-democracy groups (Kiik, 2016). The hydropower project was finally suspended 
by President Thein Sein and not continued until today (Einzenberger, 2016b; Oh & 
Andrews-Speed, 2015). In the following section, I will discuss in more detail the pol-
itics of dispossession around another, less known investment project proposed by 
Chinese investors on the border to Chin State – an area under ceasefire since 2012.
THE CASE OF MWETAUNG (GULLU MUAL) NICKEL MINE IN CHIN STATE
The mining project known as Mwetaung/Phartaung Project (which translates from 
Burmese as Snake and Frog Mountain) or Gullu Mual (after the local name) is situ-
ated right at the border between Chin State and Sagaing Region (see Figure 1).8 Chin 
State is part of the western frontier of Myanmar towards India and Bangladesh and 
is often described as the least developed region in Myanmar, difficult to access, and 
mostly mountainous. Until recently, the government had little economic interest in 
the remote region. Unlike the eastern and northern frontier, it was hardly known 
for large-scale resource extraction, except for some logging (Callahan, 2007). This 
is partly explained by its particular location bordering Northeast India, itself long 
isolated and ‘cut off’ from the rest of India. Armed conflict remained relatively low 
key in the region with the Chin National Front (CNF) taking up arms only in 1988.9 
7 At times, protest can take on dramatic forms such as the case of a farmer in Shan State who burned 
himself to death in protest against the seizure of his land by the military (Wa Lone, 2015).
8 Hereafter, the name “Mwetaung” will be used following the use in the CNRWG report and other of-
ficial documents (CNRWG, 2013; NMIC, 2013).
9 The CNF is a Chin nationalist political organization founded in 1988 and dedicated to ensuring self-
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Nevertheless, following 1988, Chin State experienced considerable militarization and 
expansion of army battalions and with it regular human rights abuses (Callahan, 2007; 
Chin Human Rights Organization, 2012; Sakhong, 2010).
The Mwetaung project is the first major extractive industries project recently pro-
posed in Chin State. It is located in Tiddim township in the Natmyaung Reserved Forest 
area, close to the town of Kalay (North Mining Investment Company Ltd. [NMIC], 
2013). Officially in Sagaing Region, Kalay functions as a sort of ‘gateway’ to nearby Chin 
State. With around 130,000 inhabitants (Ministry of Immigration and Population, 
2014), the majority of which are reportedly ethnic Chin or Zomi10, it is also an impor-
tant trading hub along the road to nearby India (bordering the Northeastern State of 
Manipur). Until very recently, Kalay also accommodated the only university and air-
port in the vicinity of Chin State.11 The border between Sagaing Region and Chin State 
begins right at the end of the town near Kalay University campus at the Chin foothills.12 
The history of the Mwetaung project dates back to the 1960s (see Table 1), when 
the Chin geologist Ngaw Cin Pau discovered major nickel deposits in the Mwetaung/
Phartaung hills (Barber, Zaw, & Crow, 2017; Vumson, 1986; Win & Myint, 1998). 
However, for decades, no further plans for exploration progressed. The self-imposed 
international isolation under the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) (1962–
1988) and the lack of capital investment and technology inhibited any large-scale 
exploitation (Oh & Andrews-Speed, 2015). Following its entrepreneurial turn in the 
early 1990s, the junta actively promoted foreign investment into mining in several 
“geologically favorable” areas including the Mwetaung hills (“Invitation to Mining 
Investors”, 1995). In 1994, the military government passed the Myanmar Mines Law 
in order “to fulfill the domestic requirements and to increase exports by producing 
more mineral products” (Leckie & Simperingham, 2010). However, it took until the 
early 2000s before the first plans for an exploitation of the mineral deposits emerged. 
Prior bids for exploration of the Mwetaung area by Western companies in the 1990s 
lead to nothing (Moody, 1999). They either shunned the political risk or questioned 
the profitability (Interview with former employee of NMIC, Yangon, December 2017). 
Only Chinese companies showed interests in further exploration. A 2008 report list-
ing Chinese investment projects in Myanmar mentioned Kingbao (Jinbao) Mining Co. 
determination for Chin State. Its armed wing is the Chin National Army with more than 200 armed sol-
diers. About least 70 CNA soldiers were killed during fighting with the Myanmar military between 1988 
and 2012. After 2003, fighting with government troops stopped (Burma News International, 2017). The 
ceasefire agreement with the CNF on state level was signed on 7 January 2012 (“Breakthrough: CNF Signed 
Ceasefire”, 2012).
10 In Northern Chin State, the local population prefers to call themselves Zomi instead of Chin and 
there is some controversy around the naming. The Zo historian Vumson (1986), for instance, prefers the 
term Zo because “he believes that names such as Kuki and Chin which originated as abuse names should 
not be adopted as designation of a people”. Sakhong (2010), on the other hand, prefers the term Chin as a 
name for a collective identity. However, there is no available official data on ethnic categories in the census 
data.
11 In the meantime – as of 2018 – a new airport is planned near the town of Falam and a new university 
was opened in Hakha. 
12 At one of the first research trips to the region in 2015, I had to pass a checkpoint and show my pass-
port right at the ‘border’ between Sagaing Region and Chin State, reinforcing the impression that it is more 
than just an internal administrative border. Until the ceasefire agreement in 2012, Chin State was only 
accessible with a special permit.
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having signed an agreement with the Ministry of Mining No. 3 to conduct exploration 
and feasibility studies on the Mwetaung (Earthrights International, 2008). According 
to local residents in the early 2000s, some Chinese workers visited the area for explo-
ration. Yet, the contract was cancelled, and new negotiations were held in 2012 with 
the North Petro-Chem Corporation of China (“Union Mines Minister Receives”, 2012). 
Finally, in May 2012 a contract for a feasibility study was signed with another Chinese 
company, North Mining Investment Company Ltd. (NMIC) (“Agreement Inked to 
Assess”, 2012). Around that time, the market price for nickel on the world market 
had reached a peak of over USD 20,000 per ton (InfoMine, n.d.). The investing com-
pany NMIC submitted a feasibility study to the ministry of mining in February, 2013 
(NMIC, 2013). According to what little is known about the project plans for the open-
cut mining, the project was to cover around 55 acres (about 22 ha), including several 
buildings for housing, offices, and storage as well as two 15-megawatt coal-fired power 
plants. The ferronickel concentrates extracted from the mine and produced on site in 
a smelter would be transported via a newly built access road and the India-Myanmar 
friendship road to a new jetty on the Chindwin River. From there, the minerals would 
be shipped to Yangon then further to China (CNRWG, 2013).
Village Consultations and Civil Society Movements
In late 2012, the local population took notice of the planned mining project for 
the first time. A Yangon-based service company named Asia Guiding Star Services 
Company Limited (AGSS) assigned by NMIC visited some of the 15 villages surround-
ing the Mwetaung/Phartaung area to collect data for the environmental, social, and 
health impact assessments.13 The service company acted as an initial intermediary 
between the Chinese investor, the government, and the local population. In this 
role, the firm tried to put pressure on the village heads to give their consent for the 
planned mining project:
Workers from AGSS company came to collect data about the water and the 
soil; their main point was to get the consent from the local people; it was only 
the first time we heard about this and it was too early to give our consent, we 
needed to discuss first; in other villages they tried to meet the village head and 
get the consent. (Interview with local residents, November 2016)
In order to convince village heads to give their consent, AGSS promised ‘devel-
opment’ for the area including new schools, hospitals, roads, and electricity. They 
generally ignored questions concerning negative impacts, while they highlighted the 
positive impacts such as jobs. Indecisive about how to respond to the proposal, sev-
eral villagers contacted local civil society organizations in the nearby town of Kalay. 
The civil society groups had already been active in civic education and other political 
awareness raising programs as soon as the opportunity had emerged in 2012. The 
awareness raising programs included “Basic Understanding of Democracy”, “Civil 
13 According to its own website, the company has been involved in the construction of the Yadana and 
Yetagun Gas Pipeline, the Traders Hotel, and many other construction projects during the time of the 
military regime prior to 2010 (Asia Guiding Star Services Company Limited [AGSS], 2012).
ASEAS 11(1) | 21
Rainer Einzenberger
Society Organizations”, and, “Development and Democracy”. The loose network 
of local civil society groups organized several rounds of public consultations. Over 
one hundred meetings and information events were organized within the first few 
months of 2013 alone (CNRWG, 2013). In the beginning, villagers were divided on 
how to respond to the proposed mining project, with one faction supporting and 
the other opposing the project. Previous experience of oppression under authoritar-
ian rule and fear of the central government played a major role in local perceptions. 
Moreover, the escalation of violence at the Letpadaung mine (located in Sagaing 
Region) had an intimidating effect. Some of the civil society actors from Kalay were 
also active themselves in the Letpadaung case before 2012.
In general what they [the villagers] said is that we have no choice because this is 
the agreement between the government and the foreign company so it is use-
less to resist; but in my opinion it was influenced by fears which are rooted in a 
long history of military oppression; they don’t accept it but they at least wanted 
to take advantage of the company, this was before civil society leaders came for 
awareness raising. (Interview with CNRWG, November 2016)
Shortly after the first consultations, a broad coalition comprising of affected vil-
lagers and urban based civil society organizations (youth groups, student groups, 
political activists) from Kalay was formed as a ‘watch group’ on the Mwetaung pro-
ject. This ad hoc coalition was subsequently officially named the Chinland Natural 
Resources Watch Group (CNRWG). Remarkably for a majority Chin/Zomi ethnic 
network in a predominately Christian area was the inclusion of non-ethnic as well 
as Buddhist groups. Indeed, one of the first big assemblies was held in a Buddhist 
monastery in Kalay where the head monk actively supported the coalition. Thus, the 
coalition tried to gain legitimacy and leverage with the Buddhist majority population 
similar to other protest movements in the country drawing strongly on Buddhist 
symbolism (Prasse-Freeman, 2015; Zaw Aung & Middleton, 2016). In addition to 
crossing ethnic and religious lines, it also had a cross-class character (including peas-
ants and urban residents) not uncommon for anti-dispossession movements (Levien, 
2013a). Considering itself a loose grassroots movement, the CNRWG opened up a 
public space for deliberation and consultation on the contested mining project.
We recommend, if you don’t know if it is good or bad, don’t make any deci-
sion. The conflict was so hot at that time. The group who opposed the project 
was accused to oppose the development. . . . The government also said like the 
company; they came together and put pressure on the villagers to sign to agree. 
After this, our group and the villagers demanded the companies and the gov-
ernment to explain to the public how they work, to explain the plan to the 
public. (Interview with CNRWG, November 2016)
The Role of the Government and Political Actors
While initial steps towards the exploitation of the Mwetaung/Phartaung hills were 
already taken under the previous military regime, the first activities on the ground 
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coincided not only with the early period of the newly inaugurated semi-civilian gov-
ernment, but also with increasing activities of the local government and local political 
parties.14 Although vested with limited powers and led by the USDP – a party known 
for its close ties to the military – the creation of state level political institutions, with a 
high representation of Chin ethnic parties, provided an opportunity for the civil socie-
ty network to advocate for more transparency, participation, and democratic decision 
making (Nixon, Joelene, Kyi Pyar, Thet Aung, & Matthew, 2013; United Nations 
Development Programme, 2014). One major achievement was to push the Chin State 
government, including the Chinese investor NMIC, to public consultations. A meeting 
was held at the town hall in Tiddim in April 2013 with both members of the CNRWG 
and concerned villagers in attendance. In preparation for the meeting, the network 
had collected a long list of questions for NMIC in order to demand detailed informa-
tion on the expected project plan and its potential impacts. Yet due to heated debates 
and furious villagers insisting to get clear answers the meeting was cut-short by the 
Chin State government. Subsequent visits by representatives of NMIC and the Chin 
State government to the affected villages ended without any results. The sticking point 
was the question about potential impacts and distribution of costs and benefits of the 
proposed project (CNRWG, 2013). After several rounds of public consultation and 
deliberation without any clear answers by the mining company and the local govern-
ment, the majority of the villagers did no longer believe in any beneficial arrangements. 
Nevertheless, the Chin State government reported to the Union government that vil-
lagers had agreed with the mining project (Thawng Zel Thang, 2013). Reportedly, the 
Chin State minister responsible for mining was facing considerable pressure from 
the central government in Naypyidaw to ensure consent for the project and support 
NMIC. Given the mixed experience with the Chin State government and its limited 
role regarding questions of resource governance (Lynn & Oye, 2014), civil society actors 
finally turned to Chin/Zomi members of parliament (MPs) at the Union level:
We changed our way of approaching; we went to the Union Hluttaw. The ex-
ecutive branch was directly influenced by the military; the MPs were a little 
more flexible than the ministers. The ministers are not elected persons. They 
don’t look at our local people’s rights. They don’t look down; they look up [to 
the central government], also this time. Our way at that time was to convince 
them [Hluttaw MPs] to be on the side of the local people. If they are powerful 
in their respective parties they will push the ministers, we hoped. And we can 
say we were successful. (Interview with civil society activist near Mwetaung, 
November 2016)
While the civil society network was autonomous from party politics, political par-
ties played an important role in the political dispute around the Mwetaung project. 
14 “About five parties participated in the 2010 election in Chin State. The National League for Democ-
racy boycotted the election nationally and parties to which it was allied in Chin also boycotted the ballot. 
The parties that competed in the state in 2010 included the Chin National Party (CNP) and Chin Progres-
sive Party (CPP), representing the Chin people at a state level, and the Union Solidarity and Development 
Party and the National Unity Party. The two Chin parties each won five seats in the 24-member state hlut-
taw” (Sithu Aung Myint, 2015). The Chief Minister in the 2010 cabinet, appointed by the president, was Pu 
Hung Ngai from the USDP – a former member of the army. He appointed the ministers of his cabinet. Pu 
Kyaw Ngein from CPP was the minister responsible for mining (“Chin State Ministers”, 2013).
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While their positions seemed to be unclear or even contradictory at the beginning, 
four of the Chin parties finally set out to conduct their own survey on the Mwetaung 
case in 2013 to get a better understanding of the local perception.15 The survey con-
cluded that – contrary to the findings of the state government – the majority of affected 
villagers disapproved of the project. The report also criticized the involvement of a 
Chinese company and stated that “local communities prefer mining companies from 
a democratic country to those from China if the project must proceed, although the 
majority objects to its implementation” (Thawng Zel Thang, 2013). Towards the end of 
2013, the Chin political parties finally aligned their position with that of the local civil 
society network after considerable grassroots lobbying. A statement was put forward 
citing “lack of information” and “lack of rule of law” as well as “little benefit” for Chin 
State, and the parties expressed their “deep concern” on the implementation to the 
project (CNRWG, 2013). While the Chin National Front (CNF), the only ethnic organi-
zation with an armed wing (the Chin National Army) had strong influence on regional 
and national politics, in particular since the ceasefire agreement in 2012 (Burma 
News International, 2017), its direct involvement in the anti-dispossession movement 
against the Mwetaung project is less clear. However, the CNF publicly stated that it 
rejects extractive industries in Chin State at this moment (“CNF Wants to Halt”, 2016). 
In November 2013, the speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house of the Union 
parliament), Shwe Mann, and regional ministers visited Kalay and met with local 
civil society. Responding to the concerns voiced by the local population, the speaker 
promised to ensure that “the project won’t damage the lives of people” (CNRWG, 
2013). Since 2014, the project has apparently been on hold. According to some res-
idents, NMIC pulled out of the project due to increasing public pressure and local 
resistance. However, a former employee of NMIC cited failed resource sharing nego-
tiations between the company and the ministry of mines and the declining world 
market price for nickel (from USD 20,000 to under 10,000) as the main reasons for 
the pull-out from the project.16 In any case, local civil society groups see the suspen-
sion of activities as a consequence of their own continuous efforts and as a success 
story of civil society mobilization (Interview with villagers near Mwetaung, November 
2016). Yet, according to recent media reports and local activists, other investors, local 
companies, and investors from India have shown new interest to explore the mining 
deposits in the area (“CNF Wants to Halt”, 2016; Mirante, 2017).
Land Rights and Resource Sharing 
An immediate concern for the local people regarding the Mwetaung project was 
the potential loss of their farmland on which they largely depended for their liveli-
hood. This was despite assurances by the mining company that no village land would 
be affected or taken (CNRWG, 2013). Given the experiences of other communities 
15 According to ethnic media reports, The Chin National Party (CNP), Chin Progressive Party (CPP), 
Ethnic National Development Party (ENDP) and Asho Chin National Party (ACNP) met with more than 
700 people from 14 villages and over 10 organizations in both Chin State and Kalay from 2 to 9 September 
2013 (Thawng Zel Thang, 2013).
16 According to the former NMIC employee, the company was dissolved after the related concessions by 
the Myanmar Investment Commission had expired. 
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with mining projects (in particular the Letpadaung mine), however, local commu-
nities stayed alerted. Already long before the first news of the mining project broke, 
villagers were afraid of being dispossessed of their land. The reason was that, as in 
many frontier areas, most farmers do not own any legal land titles for their farm-
land.17 In accordance with local customary practices, they practice swidden (shifting) 
cultivation along the slopes around Mwetaung (Ewers Anderson, 2014; Mark, 2016). 
In government maps, however, their farmland is officially categorized as ‘reserved 
forest’ under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Environmental Conservation and 
Forestry. According to government sources, this designation originated from colo-
nial times and has never been changed or verified since (Kyemon & Ju Nine, 2013). 
Typically for frontier regions, there is an overlap of claims and a mismatch between 
the official and actual land use around the Mwetaung area (NMIC, 2013). Registration 
of their farmland is challenging, if not impossible, since the national land laws intro-
duced in 2012 did not recognize customary practices of upland agriculturalists such 
as shifting cultivation. Customary rights are only enforceable as long as there is no 
interest from outside the region. The overall changes in the political economy fol-
lowing Myanmar’s opening and the new land laws and investment laws threatened 
customary institutions (Ewers Anderson, 2014). A local land rights activist criticized 
that the new farmland law (Farmland Act, 2012) and vacant land laws (The Vacant, 
Fallow and Virgin Land Act, 2012) had actually turned the villagers into “illegal set-
tlers” although they had been farming in the area already for generations. Moreover, 
he complained about the “Burman bias” of the legislation since “the Burmese don’t 
know anything about the traditional customary law of the ethnic people” (Interview 
with land rights activist, Kalay, November 2016). Also, the communities themselves 
were very conscious of the situation and challenged the state’s image of the frontier 
as an ‘empty’ and ‘virgin’ space to be brought to ‘productive’ use with the support of 
foreign investment. 
The Union government does not care about our Chin customary law. In British 
times, this was practically applied even in the high courts, but this government 
does not care at all. There is no land which is not occupied by our own people in 
Chin State. The villages have exact boundaries and they occupy all areas. There 
is not even a single inch of land not occupied in our Chin customary land use 
system. But this is not accepted by our government. (Interview with villagers 
near Mwetaung, November 2016)
Even though the 2016 National Land Use Policy (NLUP) envisions the recogni-
tion of customary land use systems and calls for the revision of land use maps and 
records through public consultation processes, little has happened on the ground 
(The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2016). On the contrary, in late 2016, the par-
liamentary Commission for Legal and Special Issues Analysis pointed out that “it is 
not necessary to include the ethnic nationalities’ land use rights as a separate part in 
the National Land Use Policy” (The Commission for Legal and Special Issues Analysis, 
2016). Also, according to land rights activists, the National League for Democracy 
17 According to Ewers Anderson (2014), only an estimated 15% of all land in Myanmar is titled.
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(NLD) government did not follow up on the NLUP implemented under their rival 
USDP government. Even though solving the land problems was one of the central 
promises of the NLD during its election campaign, the government was slow to solve 
existing problems or reform laws. To take matters in their own hand, some villagers 
around Mwetaung are meanwhile seeking legal protection through community for-
est registration, even if the process is complicated and slow. This gives communities 
the opportunity to obtain official permission from the Forestry Department to use 
a demarcated forest area for 30 years. Yet, it is still unclear if this approach will be 
feasible and ensure the long-term interests of the communities (Einzenberger, 2017; 
Kyaw Tint, Springate-Baginski, & Mehm Ko Ko Gyi, 2011).
In addition to the immediate dangers of dispossession, villagers also rejected 
the government’s justification for the mining project and the terms of the deal. One 
argument brought forward by the central government was that Chin State should 
also contribute to the national budget to finance national development, since the 
poor state was still a net receiver fully financed by the Union. In addition, accord-
ing to media reports and Chin politicians, only 2-5% of the benefits or around USD 
500,000 were earmarked for Chin State (Ei Ei Toe Lwin, 2013; Mirante, 2017). The 
resisting villagers, framed as ‘narrow minded’ and ‘anti-development’ by the investor 
and the government, rejected the project’s unfair distribution of costs and benefits. 
The promised benefit would amount to only around one US dollar per year and cap-
ita, as one villager amusedly remarked in an interview. The major bulk of the benefits 
would go to the central government’s budget, and the Chinese investor according to 
the sharing agreements (which in the end failed). In public statements, the commu-
nities made clear that they regarded the mineral deposits in the Mwetaung area as 
‘Chin property’ to be used for future generations only under a federal system which 
guaranteed the self-determination of Chin State.
Local land rights activists also claimed that the central government tried to gain 
control over the Mwetaung area by other, more indirect means. They accused the gov-
ernment of shifting the demarcation of the border between Chin State and Sagaing 
Region and thus shifting the Mwetaung area out of the jurisdiction of Chin State 
into the more “mining friendly” Sagaing Region (Mirante, 2017). This process has 
become known as the ‘boundary issue’. Already in 2008, the CNF officially “lambasted 
the Burmese military junta over its plan to add some parts of Zomi (Chin) State into 
Sagaing Division”. According to a media report, “around 8,000 acres of farmland, 
teak forests and Gulu mual called ‘Mwe Taung’ nickel and chromium mining areas” 
would be included in the Sagaing Division (“CNF Criticizes Burmese Regime”, 2008). 
Local land rights groups recently tried to collect historical evidence to prove that 
Chin State slowly lost territory, which had been incorporated by the ‘lowland regions’ 
since independence, and started to advocate with the local government (Interview 
with land rights activist, January 2017).
Indigenous Rights and Transnational Mobilization
The local communities’ historical and identity-based claims of ownership were also 
accompanied by international indigenous rights discourses. One of the first pub-
lic events organized by local civil society groups during the mobilization campaign 
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took up the issue of Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC). Banners donated by a local 
civil society organization were displayed at public exhibitions at villages around the 
Mwetaung area (CNRWG, 2013). The banners explained the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the concept of FPIC as one of its core 
principles in the Burmese language (United Nations, 2008). Villagers resented the 
complete lack of information and transparency around the mining project. Neither 
the local government nor the investing company had informed the residents in 
advance about the plans, despite long running preparations (see Table 1). Instead, vil-
lagers were pressured to provide their consent to the project ad hoc without any clear 
and detailed information, being only provided with some vague pamphlets (described 
by one activist as propaganda). Also, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and 
Social Impact and Health Assessment (SIA/HIA) reports, which according to NMIC 
were submitted to the Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry in 
March 2013, were never disclosed to the public (NMIC, 2013).18 Drawing on inter-
national indigenous rights instruments, local civil society groups made use of an 
emerging transnational indigenous rights discourse in order to defend their interests 
(Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, Institute for Human Rights and Business, 
& The Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2016). In 2015, a Coalition of Indigenous 
Peoples in Myanmar/Burma, a network of over 20 (ethnic) organizations (including 
Chin organizations), submitted a report for the 2015 Universal Periodic Review to 
the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. In the report, the network criticized the 
increasing confiscation of land and the violation of indigenous rights, citing also the 
Mwetaung case (Coalition of Indigenous Peoples in Myanmar/Burma, 2015).
A transnational dimension to the Mwetaung campaign was added to the local 
movement in August 2013 when exile groups, identifying themselves as ‘indigenous 
Zomi’, gathered in cities in the United States, Norway, India, Australia, and other 
countries to protest against the planned mining project in their ‘homeland’. In 
Washington DC, representatives of the World Zomi Congress condemned the sus-
pected “confiscation of land” and exploitation of natural resources in Chin State in 
front of the Chinese Embassy and called for an immediate stop of the project (Khaipi, 
2013). In their public statements, they directly referred to the UNDRIP and claimed 
ownership over their “indigenous land”:
We are here today as Zomi National Indigenous People from Burma who are 
oppressed by our government. The reason we are here today is that the Chinese 
North Mining Company and the Chinese government and the Burmese gov-
ernment are mining in our land, our indigenous, own land. . . . As the indige-
nous people in Myanmar, we have the right to claim according to UNDRIP arti-
cle 25 and 27. That is why the Gullu Mual Nickel project . . . is our own property 
and we are here to stop it today. Therefore, until the Burmese government has 
changed our constitutional law which will give us the right to own our land, 
we will stop this project. (WZC Channel, 2013 [transcript of YouTube video, 
min. 8:45-11:16])
18 Local villagers and activists only received pictures of the report cover, but never copies of the full 
report.
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While locally the civil society alliance was crossing ethnic and religious divides, 
including Burman Buddhist groups, as well as Christian ethnic groups, identity-based 
claims (such as in the quote above) were still obvious. In public consultations, local 
villagers repeatedly claimed that the mineral deposits were “Chin property” to be pre-
served for future generations and that the Myanmar government or Chinese investors 
had no right to extract them. However, in what way local coalitions were directly 
linked with transnational ‘indigenous Zomi’ campaigns against the Mwetaung pro-
ject is still unclear. According to the CNRWG, there was only limited contact with 
groups overseas.
CONCLUSION
The case of the Mwetaung mining project discussed in this paper illustrates the strat-
egy of accumulation by dispossession in the frontier areas as a persistent element 
of Myanmar’s political economy. Through this particular regime of dispossession, 
described here as frontier capitalism, the periphery is gradually turned into a supplier 
of resource revenues to fuel economic growth at the center while gaining little bene-
fits itself. The country’s latest transition, including the introduction of a series of legal 
and political reforms, facilitated investment (in particular from its neighbors) and 
provided a new dynamic for the expansion of the frontier. This expansion relies on 
the support of foreign capital, in particular China, since the early 2000s. In the case of 
the Mwetaung project, the attempted dispossession has been successfully challenged, 
at least for the moment, by a local civil society coalition using new opportunities 
for political participation. The politics of dispossession in this case were character-
ized by political strategies targeting newly established democratic institutions. The 
mobilization was initiated by an ad hoc grassroots coalition based on emerging civil 
society actors since 2011 (such as the CNRWG). The movement was independent 
from political parties, but targeted political actors on regional, national, and even 
transnational political scales. Despite bridging ethnic and religious divides locally, 
demands for indigenous rights and self-determination, including land and resource 
governance rights were voiced by actors identifying themselves as ethnic Chin or 
indigenous Zomi. This divergent and even contradictory character is not uncommon 
for anti-dispossession movements. While local initiatives did not reject extractive 
development projects as such, they rejected the authoritarian and non-transparent 
manner in which this particular project was unfolding. A main concern was the dis-
possession of their agricultural lands, which are not legally recognized under the 
current legal framework introduced as part of the current transition. This framework 
is considered biased towards the majority lowland population and ignorant of eth-
nic customary practices. Given the particular political history in this frontier region, 
local communities rejected the government’s demands as illegitimate and showed 
little trust in the promises made by the government and investors. This was mixed 
with strong anti-Chinese sentiments – a legacy of recent experiences in the region 
and beyond. Yet, the frontier regions, including Chin State, will likely face further 
coercive integration and exploitation in the context of future regional initiatives 
such as Chinas Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Following China’s involvement, India 
is also seeking to enhance the integration of trade and investment in the northeast 
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through its Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation 
(BCIM) Economic Corridor. Unless the central government and investors are pre-
pared to change their approach and renegotiate conditions of integration, including 
decentralized decision-making and benefit-sharing agreements, politics of disposses-
sion will continue to shape Myanmar’s transition. 
DATE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AROUND THE MWETAUNG (GULLU MUAL) MINING PROJECT
1960s Initial geological surveys by Dr. Ngaw Cin Pau
1988 SLORC takes over power after uprising in August 1988
1994 SLORC adopts new Mines Law
1995 Announcement in government newspaper invites foreign companies to conduct mineral prospecting and exploration operations
2005
Kingbao (Jinbao) Mining Ltd of China signed an agreement on nickel mineral explora-
tion and feasibility study with No. 3 Mining Enterprise of the Ministry of Mines. After 
initial explorations, the contract expires. 
2010 General elections on November 7
2012 CNF signs 9-point state level ceasefire agreement in January
2012 New negotiations are held in April concerning exploration of minerals in Mwetaung with the North Petro-Chem Corporation of China
2012 CNF signs Union Level 15-point ceasefire agreement in May
2012 North Mining Investment Co. Ltd receives permission for ferro nickel deposit feasibility study in May
2013 Asia Guiding Star Services Company Limited (AGSS) starts to collect data for EIA/SIA surveys in January
2013 Local communities seek advice concerning Mwetaug project from Kalay CSOs in January
Figure 1. Location of Mwetaung mining project, bordering Chin State and Sagaing Region. 
(Myanmar Information Management Unit, figure by the author).
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2013 Formation of local CSO networks at local monastery in Kalay
2013 Media campaign in Kalay town
2013 Poster exhibitions on FPIC in local villages 
2013 Village consultation meetings around Mwetaung area between January and February with hundreds of participants
2013 Civil society coalition on Mwetaung is renamed to Chinland Natural Resources Watch Group (CNRWG) in February
2013 North Mining Investment Co. Ltd submits feasibility reports on 'Mwetaung Nickel Smelt-ing Project' to the Ministries of Mines, and Environmental Conservation and Forestry 
2013 
Reports of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Social Impact Assessment (SIA) 
and Health Impact Assessment (HIA) are submitted to Ministry of Environmental Con-
servation and Forestry
2013
Meeting with local political parties in March
Discussion of Mwetaung Project at Chin State parliament 
2013 Public consultation with local government and NMIC in Tiddim town hall, NRWG pres-ents 48 questions in April 
2013 NMIC holds village meetings
2013 Buddhist monk and CNRWG members meet with local media
2013 Meeting with Chin regional government and Chin MPs in Hakha in May
2013 Meeting at Tiddim town hall: Manager from NMIC answer 46 questions
2013 CNRWG sends letter to the Mr. Quintana, UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar in August
2013 CNRWG and GDI conduct collaborative research in Mwetaung area in August and Sep-tember
2013 Representatives of four Chin political parties conduct a survey on the Mwetaung project with local communities in September
2013 Chin parties meet with state government in Hakha
2013 Press conference in Yangon with CNRW, GDI, Chin political parties and civil society representatives
2013 Meeting with speaker of Union Parliament (lower house) Shwe Mann in Kalay in November
2014 According to media reports in January, the Gullu Mual project has been suspended
Table 1. Chronology of events around the Mwetaung (Gullu Mual) mining project. 
(“Agreement Inked to”, 2012; “Breakthrough: CNF Signed Ceasefire”, 2012; CNRWG, 2013).
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